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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. Is the Farmers Insurance Exchange automobile liability 
insurance policy issued to Frank M. Barber required to provide 
coverage to Frank's son, Mario T. Barber, for use by Mario of a non-
owned, uninsured motorcycle where the policy excludes such coverage? 
2. Can Farmers Insurance Exchange be held liable for extra 
contractual damages for "bad faith" for refusing to afford coverage 
where the coverage is excluded under its policy and is not required 
by statute? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The statute in question is § 41-12-21 of the Safety Responsibility 
Act, Utah Code Annotated, 19 53, which provides that in order for a 
policy to comply with the Safety Responsibility Act it must contain 
the following coverage: 
(b) Such owner's policy of liability 
insurance: 
(1) shall designate by explicit description 
or by appropriate reference all motor vehicles 
with respect to which coverage is thereby to be 
granted; and 
(2) shall insure the person named therein 
and any other person, as insured, using any such 
motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express 
or implied permission of such named insured, 
against loss from the liability imposed by law 
for damages arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of such motor vehicle or motor 
vehicles within the United States of America or 
the Dominion of Canada, subject to limits 
exclusive of interest and costs, with respect 
to each such motor vehicle, in the amount 
specified in section 41-12-1 (k) of this act. 
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(c) Such operator's policy of liability 
insurance shall insure the person named as 
insured therein against loss from the liability 
imposed upon him by law for damages arising out 
of the use by him of any motor vehicle not owned 
by him, within the same territorial limits and 
subject to the same limits of liability as are 
set forth above with respect to an owner's policy 
of liability insurance. 
(d) Such motor vehicle liability policy 
shall state the name and address of the named 
insured, the coverage afforded by the policy, 
the premium charged therefor, the policy period 
and the limits of liability, and shall contain 
an agreement or be endorsed that insurance is 
provided thereunder in accordance with the 
coverage defined in this act as respects bodily 
injury and death or property damage, or both, 
and is subject to all the provisions of this act. 
(g) Any policy which grants the coverage 
required for a motor vehicle liability policy 
may also grant any lawful coverage in excess of 
or in addition to the coverage specified for a 
motor vehicle liability policy and such excess 
or additional coverage shall not be subject to 
the provisions of this act. With respect to a 
policy which grants such excess or additional 
coverage the term "motor vehicle liability 
policy" shall apply only to that part of the 
coverage which is required by this section. 
. . . (Emphasis added) 
The term "motor vehicle" is defined under the Safety 
Responsibility Act at § 41-12-1 (e), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
follows: 
"Motor vehicle" means every self-propelled 
vehicle which is designed for use upon a highway, 
including trailers and semitrailers designed for 
use with such vehicles (except traction engines, 
road rollers, farm tractors, tractor cranes, 
power shovels, and well drillers) and every 
vehicle which is propelled by electric power 
obtained from overhead wires but not operated 
upon rails. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action by which plaintiffs, Frank M. Barber 
(hereinafter "Frank") and Mario T. Barber (hereinafter "Mario"), are 
seeking a determination that defendant, Farmers Insurance Exchange 
(hereinafter "Farmers"), owed liability insurance coverage to Mario 
for an accident which occurred while Mario was operating a non-owned, 
uninsured motorcycle. Frank and Mario further are seeking damages 
for emotional distress and punitive damages for alleged "bad faith" 
on the part of Farmers in refusing to provide a defense to Mario in 
a lawsuit for damages to an automobile resulting from the accident. 
Course of Proceedings 
The case was submitted to the District Court on cross-motions 
by the Barbers and Farmers for summary judgment, based on uncontro-
verted facts. 
Disposition 
The District Court, Judge Ray M. Harding, presiding, entered 
judgment in favor of Farmers and against the Barbers, holding that 
Mario was not entitled to liability insurance coverage under the 
Farmers policy. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is no dispute regarding the relevant facts. The uncon-
troverted facts are as follows: 
On March 21, 1983, plaintiff Mario T. Barber (hereinafter 
"Mario"), a minor, drove an uninsured motorcycle owned by one Steve 
Olson into an automobile owned by one Robert Bernards. (R. 2, 55, 
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106). At the time of the accident Mr. Bernards1 automobile was 
insured under a policy issued by defendantf Farmers Insurance Exchange 
(hereinafter "Farmers"). (R. 5, 106). Farmers Insurance Exchange 
paid to Mr. Bernards for the damage to his automobile the sum of 
$608.34f less Mr. Bernards' deductible. (R. 80f 106, 206). 
Pursuant to the subrogation provisions of the Farmers policy, 
Farmers retained attorney David D. Jeffs, who brought suit in the 
name of Robert Bernards against Mario T. Barber, Steve Olson and 
"John Doe 1 through 5" to collect the amount of the damage to Mr. 
Bernards' automobile. (R. 5-6, 55-57, 106). 
At the time of the accident, Mario's father, Frank M. Barber 
(hereinafter "Frank"), was the named insured under another policy 
issued by Farmers Insurance Exchange to cover Frank's 19 74 Honda 
automobile. (R. 67, 106, 206). Frank's attorneys, Ivie & Young, 
tendered the defense of the lawsuit against Mario to Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, claiming that Mario was entitled to coverage under Frank's 
policy for the accident in question. (R. 6, 86, 89). Farmers denied 
coverage on the ground that the Farmers policy specifically excluded 
coverage for use by Mario of a non-owned motorcycle. (R. 87-88). 
The Farmers policy contains the following provisions: 
DEFINITION OF INSURED 
The unqualified word "insured" includes 
• . . 
(b) with respect to a non-owned automobile, 
(1) the named insured or a relative, and 
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(2) any other person or organization not 
owning or hiring such automobile if legally 
responsible for its use by the named insured or 
a relative, but only in the event such named 
insured or relative is legally liable for the 
occurrence; provided the actual use of the non-
owned automobile by the persons in (1) and (2) 
above is with the permission of the owner. 
(Emphasis added) 
ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS 
Automobile means a four-wheel land motor vehicle 
designed for use principally upon public roadsf 
except a midget automobile, and includes any 
trailer designed for use with a private passenger 
automobile. 
Non-owned automobile means an automobile not 
owned by or regularly or frequently used by the 
named insured or any resident of the same house-
hold, other than a substitute automobile. 
Relative means a relative of the named insured 
who is a resident of the same household, pro-
vided neither such relative nor his spouse owns 
an automobile. (Emphasis added) (R. 60). 
There was a great deal of correspondence between the law firm 
of Ivie & Young and attorney David D. Jeffs (R. 80-94), after which 
attorney Jeffs decided the lawsuit was not worth the effort and 
dismissed the suit of Robert Bernards v. Mario T. Barber (R. 95). 
Frank and Mario then filed this lawsuit against Farmers, alleging 
that Farmers breached its contract with Frank by refusing to provide 
insurance coverage for Mario for the accident in question and further 
alleging that Farmers was guilty of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, violations of insurance department regulations 
and statutes, breach of fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs and 
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intentional interference with plaintiffs1 property interests. 
Plaintiffs further alleged that Farmers was guilty of willful and 
malicious conduct, for which plaintiffs sought punitive damages (R. 
4-10). 
The District Court found that neither the Farmers policy nor 
any relevant statutes required that Mario have coverage under the 
Farmers policy for use of a non-owned, uninsured motorcycle and the 
Court granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers Insurance Exchange. 
(R. 233, 234). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Under the clear and unambiguous terms of the Farmers policy, 
there is no coverage for the use by Mario of a non-owned motorcycle. 
The policy very clearly provides coverage only for use of a four-
wheel motor vehicle. 
Frank and Mario concede that the clear terms of the policy 
exclude coverage for use by Mario of a non-owned motorcycle, but 
they contend that the policy is required by the Utah Safety Respon-
sibility Act to provide such coverage. 
There is nothing in the Utah Safety Responsibility Act which 
requires coverage to Mario for use of a non-owned motorcycle. Mario 
is not the named insured under the Farmers policy but is covered 
only under the additional coverage for "relatives" of the named 
insured. Since the coverage of the Farmers policy for "relatives" 
of the named insured is additional coverage, not controlled by the 
provisions of the Safety Responsibility Act, the Safety Responsibility 
Act by its own terms has no application. Since, the Safety 
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Responsibility Act has no application the Farmers policy should be 
enforced pursuant to its terms. Under the clear and unambiguous 
terms of the Farmers policy, there is no coverage for the use by 
Mario Barber of a non-owned motorcycle. Therefore, the District 
Court properly held that Mario is not entitled to liability coverage 
under the Farmers policy. 
Even if Mario were entitled to coverage under the Farmers policy, 
there is no basis for the plaintiffs' claims of extra contractual 
damages for "bad faith." Farmers cannot be held in bad faith for 
merely following the clear and unambiguous terms of its policy, 
particularly where there is no statute or case which would require 
such coverage. 
An insurance carrier cannot be held liable to the insured for 
extra contractual damages for denying coverage, even if the insurance 
carrier is wrong in denying coverage, unless there is a showing of 
bad faith or spiteful, contentious or obstructive litigation by the 
insurance carrier. There is no evidence whatsoever of any such bad 
faith or improper conduct on the part of Farmers. Therefore, 
plaintiffs' claims of "bad faith" have absolutely no basis and were 
properly dismissed by the District Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT THE FARMERS 
INSURANCE EXCHANGE AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY 
INSURANCE POLICY ISSUED TO FRANK M. BARBER DID 
NOT AFFORD COVERAGE TO FRANK'S SON, MARIO T. 
BARBER, FOR USE BY MARIO OF A NON-OWNEDf UNINSURED 
MOTORCYCLE WHERE THE POLICY EXCLUDED SUCH 
COVERAGE. 
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Plaintiffs' action is very simply a claim that Farmers owed 
liability coverage to Mario for an automobile accident and Farmers 
refused to provide such coverage or to defend the lawsuit brought 
against Mario for that accident. The clear and unambiguous terms of 
the policy and the provisions of Utah law clearly establish that 
Mario was not entitled to such coverage. 
The Farmers policy very plainly excludes coverage for use by 
the insured of non-owned motorcycles. The policy defines "insured" 
as follows: 
DEFINITION OF INSURED 
The unqualified word "insured" includes 
(b) with respect to a non-owned automobile, 
(1) the named insured or a relative, and 
(2) any other person or organization not 
owning or hiring such automobile if legally 
responsible for its use by the named insured or 
a relative, but only in the event such named 
insured or relative is legally liable for the 
occurrence; provided the actual use of the non-
owned automobile by the persons in (1) and (2) 
above is with the permission of the owner. 
(Emphasis added) 
The policy defines "automobile" as follows: 
Automobile means a four-wheel land motor vehicle 
designed for use principally upon public roads, 
except a midget automobilef and includes any 
trailer designed for use with a private passenger 
automobile. (Emphasis added) 
Thus, the policy very clearly provides coverage only for use 
of four-wheel motor vehicles, and not for use of non-owned motorcycles. 
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The Barbers concede that the clear terms of the policy exclude 
coverage for use by Mario Barber of a non-owned motorcycle, but they 
contend that the policy is required by the Utah Safety Responsibility 
Act to provide such coverage. 
§ 41-12-21, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, sets forth the 
requirements for coverage under an automobile liability insurance 
policy in order for that policy to comply with the Utah Safety 
Responsibility Act. The Utah Supreme Court previously held that the 
Safety Responsibility Act had no application to policies unless they 
were issued after an accident as proof of financial responsibility. 
Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company v. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 315 P.2d 
277 (1957), and Western Casualty and Surety Company v. Transamerica 
Insurance Company, 26 Utah 2d 50, 484 P.2d 1180 (1971). In 1980, 
however, the Utah Supreme Court re-examined § 41-12-21, in light of 
a provision of the No-Fault Insurance Act requiring liability coverage 
in compliance with the Safety Responsibility Act. 
In Allstate Insurance Company v. United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Company, 619 P.2d 329 (Utah 19 80), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that a provision of a USF&G automobile liability policy which 
restricted coverage to only certain drivers was invalid, up to the 
minimum limits of coverage under the Safety Responsibility Act because 
it conflicted with the requirements of § 41-12-21, Utah Code Annotated, 
19 53. The Court reasoned that the No-Fault Insurance Act, which 
became effective in 1974, requires that all resident owners of motor 
vehicles have liability insurance which qualifies under the Safety 
Responsibility Act and since § 41-12-21 requires coverage to all 
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permissive users of the described automobile, the USF&G policy must 
provide coverage up to the minimum limits for all permissive users. 
There is some question as to whether the Allstate case would 
apply to the facts of the present case. For purposes of analysis, 
however, we will assume that the Allstate case does apply and the 
Farmers policy must comply with the requirements of § 41-12-21 of 
the Utah Safety Responsibility Act. 
§ 41-12-21, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides that in order 
for a policy to comply with the Safety Responsibility Act it must 
contain the following coverage: 
(b) Such owner's policy of liability 
insurance: 
(1) shall designate by explicit description 
or by appropriate reference all motor vehicles 
with respect to which coverage is thereby to* be 
granted; and 
(2) shall insure the person named therein 
and any other person, as insured, using any such 
motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express 
or implied permission of such named insured, 
against loss from the liability imposed by law 
for damages arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of such motor vehicle...in 
the amount specified in section 41-12-1 (k) of 
this act. 
(c) Such operator's policy of liability 
insurance shall insure the person named as 
insured therein against loss from the liability 
imposed upon him by law for damages arising out 
of the use by him of any motor vehicle not owned 
by him, within the same territorial limits and 
subject to the same limits of liability as are 
set forth above with respect to an owner's policy 
of liability insurance. 
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The term "motor vehicle" is defined under the Safety 
Responsibility Act at § 41-12-1 (e), Utah Code Annotated, 1953f as 
follows: 
"Motor vehicle" means every self-propelled 
vehicle which is designed for use upon a highway, 
including trailers and semitrailers designed for 
use with such vehicles (except traction engines, 
road rollers, farm tractors, tractor cranes, 
power shovels, and well drillers) and every 
vehicle which is propelled by electric power 
obtained from overhead wires but not operated 
upon rails. 
Plaintiffs contend that the Farmers policy is required to provide 
coverage to Mario Barber for the use of a non-owned motorcycle because 
the Safety Responsibility Act defines "motor vehicle" to include 
motorcycles. This simply is not the fact. 
Mario was not the named insured under the Farmers policy but 
was covered under the additional coverage for "relatives" of the 
named insured. § 41-12-21 requires only that the policy provide 
coverage for use of the described automobile by the named insured 
and any permissive users of the described automobile [§ 41-12-21 
(b) ] and for use by the named insured of any non-owned motor vehicles 
[§ 41-12-21 (c)]. The act contains no requirement that the policy 
provide any coverage at all to a relative of the named insured, such 
as Mario. The coverage afforded by the Farmers policy to Mario for 
use of a non-owned vehicle is additional coverage, not required by 
the Safety Responsibility Act. 
The Safety Responsibility Act provides at § 41-12-21 (g), that 
the policy may provide any coverage in excess of or in addition to 
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the coverage specified in the act and such coverage "shall not be 
subject to the provisions of this act." The exact language is as 
follows: 
(g) Any policy which grants the coverage 
required for a motor vehicle liability policy 
may also grant any lawful coverage in excess of 
or in addition to the coverage specified for a 
motor vehicle liability policy and such excess 
or additional coverage shall not be subject to 
the provisions of this act. With respect to a 
policy which grants such excess or additional 
coverage the term "motor vehicle liability 
policy" shall apply only to that part of the 
coverage which is required by this section. 
Since the coverage of the Farmers policy for the use by a 
"relative" of a non-owned automobile is additional coverage, not 
controlled by the provisions of the Safety Responsibility Act, the 
Safety Responsibility Act by its own terms has no application. Mario 
Barber was not a named insured under the Farmers policy but was 
covered only as a "relative" under the additional coverage of the 
policy. Therefore, the Safety Responsibility Act has no application 
and the Farmers policy should be enforced in accordance with its terms. 
The Barbers argue that the District Court misconstrued the 
requirements of the Safety Responsibility Act and failed to consider 
the Supreme Court's decision in Coates v. American Economy Insurance 
Company, 627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981). Their attorney fails to point out 
that after the Court issued its first Memorandum Decision the attorney 
sent a letter to the Court arguing that the Coates case was 
determinative and he sent a copy of the Coates decision to the Court. 
Judge Harding considered the Coates case and then issued a supplemental 
ruling, affirming the summary judgment previously entered. A copy 
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of that supplemental ruling appears in the Addendum to this brief. 
Farmers agrees that the Coates decision held that under certain 
circumstances the operator of a motorcycle is entitled to automobile 
no-fault insurance benefits under his automobile policy. That case 
certainly did not hold, however, that an insurance carrier must 
provide automobile liability insurance coverage to a relative of the 
named insured for that relative's use of a non-owned motorcycle. Such 
a requirement would be totally contrary to the provisions of the 
Safety Responsibility Act. 
Under the clear and unambiguous terms of the Farmers policy 
there is no coverage for the use by Mario, as a "relative", of a 
non-owned motorcycle. There is no requirement in the Safety Respon-
sibility Act for such coverage. To the contrary, the act specifically 
provides that such additional coverage is not subject to the provisions 
of the act. Therefore, Mario is not entitled to liability coverage 
under the Farmers policy and the District Court correctly granted 
summary judgment to Farmers. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED FARMERS CANNOT 
BE HELD LIABLE FOR EXTRA CONTRACTUAL DAMAGES FOR 
"BAD FAITH" FOR REFUSING TO AFFORD COVERAGE WHERE 
COVERAGE WAS EXCLUDED UNDER ITS POLICY AND WAS 
NOT REQUIRED BY STATUTE. 
In addition to the Barbers1 claim for attorneys fees in defending 
the suit against Mario, the Barbers further claim that they are 
entitled to extra contractual damages of attorneys fees in bringing 
this action against Farmers, damages for emotional distress and 
-13-
punitive damages for willful and malicious misconduct on the part 
of Farmers in refusing to defend Mario. Even if Mario were entitled 
to coverage under the Farmers policy, which he clearly was not, there 
is no evidence whatsoever to support these claims of extra contractual 
damages. 
The landmark case for extra contractual damages against an 
insurer is Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 
1985), in which the Court held that an insurer has an implied 
obligation of good faith in an insurance contract and the insured 
can have an action in contract for breach of that obligation. The 
critical point is that there must be a showing of bad faith on the 
part of the insurance carrier in order to recover consequential 
damages. An insurer will not be held liable for consequential damages 
where the insurer seeks to have a legitimate question of coverage 
decided in the courts, even where the insurer ultimately loses, where 
there is no showing of bad faith or spiteful, contentious or 
obstructive litigation. Western Casualty and Surety Company v. 
Marchant, 615 P.2d 423 (Utah 1980). 
Plaintiffs1 Complaint is in five counts, alleging four separate 
bases for extra contractual damages, none of which are supported by 
any evidence. 
Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
The Second Claim of plaintiffs1 Complaint alleges merely that 
Farmers refused to provide a defense to plaintiffs and thereby Farmers 
intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon plaintiffs. 
-14-
The law is well established that there can be no cause of action 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress unless the 
defendant's conduct was extreme, outrageous and intolerable. Samms 
v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961). It is absurd to 
suggest that by enforcing the clear and unambiguous terms of its 
policy. Farmers intended to inflict emotional distress or recklessly 
inflicted such emotional distress upon Mario. It is equally absurd 
to suggest that Farmers conduct was extreme, outrageous or intoler-
able. Plaintiffs simply have no basis for a claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. 
Plaintiffs' Allegations of Violations of Laws and Insurance Department 
Regulations. 
The Third Claim of plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that Farmers 
violated "appropriate Insurance Department regulations" and 
"appropriate laws" and that in violating such regulations and laws 
Farmers was willful and malicious, entitling plaintiffs to punitive 
damages. When asked in interrogatories which regulations were 
violated, plaintiffs merely referred to a stack of regulations from 
the insurance department referring to unfair claims settlement 
practices. (R. 70-79). These regulations deal with settlement of 
insurance claims and have nothing whatsoever to do with the defense 
of liability claims under an insurance policy. 
Plaintiffs further stated in their Answers to Interrogatories 
that defendant violated the provisions of the Safety Responsibility 
Act discussed above (R. 42-43). Again, it is absurd to suggest that 
Farmers denial of liability insurance coverage to Mario under the 
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clear terms of the Farmers policy was in willful or malicious violation 
of any statute or regulation, since the Safety Responsibility Act 
by its own terms does not apply to the use by a relative of a non-
owned motorcycle and there is at the very least a justiciable 
controversy as to whether coverage applies. Plaintiffs clearly have 
no basis for their claim that Farmers willfully and maliciously 
violated any statutes or laws. 
Plaintiffs' Allegations of Bad Faith 
The Fourth Claim of plaintiffs' Complaint alleges Farmers 
breached its obligation of good faith by refusing to defend the suit 
against Mario. As indicated above, the Utah Supreme Court held in 
Western Casualty and Surety Company v. Marchant, 615 P.2d 423 (Utah 
1980), that an insurance carrier will not be liable for attorneys 
fees or any other consequential damages for refusal to provide 
insurance coverage, even if the insurance carrier is ultimately found 
to owe coverage, unless there is a showing of bad faith or spiteful, 
contentious or obstructive litigation on the part of the insurance 
carrier. Since the Farmers policy very clearly excluded coverage 
for the use of a non-owned motorcycle by Mario and the Utah Safety 
Responsibility Act did not apply to Mario, and since the District 
Court has found there was no coverage, there was at the very least 
a justiciable controversy and Farmers cannot be held in "bad faith" 
for refusing to provide a defense to Mario. 
Plaintiffs' Claims of Intentional Interference with Property 
Interests. 
-16-
The Fifth Claim of plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that the Barbers 
had a protected property interest in insurance benefits under the 
Farmers policy and Farmers intentionally and willfully interfered 
with such protected property interests, justifying an award of 
punitive damages, attorneys fees and "other special damages." 
Plaintiffs apparently are confusing this case with an action 
against an insurance company for direct benefits under a policy 
insuring property, health or life. This appears to be another claim 
that Farmers owed insurance coverage to Mario for the accident in 
question and refused to provide such coverage. Once again, the 
policy very clearly excluded such coverage and the exclusion is 
supported by the terms of the Financial Responsibility Act. At the 
very least, there is a justiciable controversy and Farmers cannot 
be held in "bad faith" for refusing to provide coverage. 
CONCLUSION 
The Farmers policy very clearly excludes coverage for the use 
by Mario of a non-owned motorcycle. There is nothing in the Utah 
Safety Responsibility Act which would require Farmers to provide 
coverage. Mario is not the named insured under the Farmers policy 
but is covered only under the additional coverage for "relatives" 
of the named insured. Such coverage is additional to the coverage 
required by the Safety Responsibility Act, and the act by its own 
terms has no application. Therefore, the clear terms of the Farmers 
policy apply and the District Court correctly held that Mario is not 
entitled to coverage under the Farmers policy. Even if there were 
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any question as to whether Mario was entitled to coverage under the 
Farmers policy, at the very least there is a justiciable controversy 
as to whether coverage applies and Farmers cannot be held in "bad 
faith" for refusing to afford coverage to Mario. Furthermore, there 
clearly is no basis for a claim of willful or malicious misconduct 
on the part of Farmers in merely enforcing the terms of its policy. 
Therefore, there is no basis for plaintiffs' claims of extra 
contractual damages and punitive damages and the District Court 
properly entered summary judgment dismissing those claims. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, therefore, respectfully submits that the summary 
judgment entered by the District Court should be affirmed. 
DATED this ^— day of ^ ^ ^ ^ T , 19 86. 
BA^LE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
• * • • * * * 
BARBER, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Defendant. 
Case Number 66519 
SUPPLEMENTAL RULING 
• * • • • • * * 
The court, having considered Coates v. American Economy 
Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 92 as it relates to the issues of defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment issues the following supplemental 
ruling. 
The court notes that, contrary to plaintiff's letter of 
April 14, 1986, Coates does not speak to the scope of the 
definition of a motor vehicle in the No-Fault act, and was not 
dispositive of any issue raised by the parties in this case. The 
court also notes that the issues of the Coates case were not 
raised before this court by either party. 
DATED this ^ 5 ^ day o 
cc: Ray Phillips Ivie 
A. Alma Nelson 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT were mailed this ^- day of ^^C&ff , 1986, to: 
Ray Phillips Ivie 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
48 North University Avenue 
P. 0. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
AARON ALMA NELSON 
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